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STATE v. HAGEN
Cite at 802 T2d 745 (UuhApp. 1990)

solely upon the same erroneous minute entry and the record's subsequent silence as
to a second hearing for the proposition that
the decision was not made on June 29th.1
Furthermore, the record does provide a basis for concluding that leave was in fact
granted on June 29th. Zions filed its answer to the third party complaint on July
2nd, only three days after the nunc pro
tunc order stated that leave was granted.
It is reasonable to conclude that a party as
experienced in litigation as Zions would not
have filed an answer to a "proposed" third
party complaint before it became effective.
I would therefore accept the representation
made by the nunc pro tunc order that leave
was in fact granted on June 29th.

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
Robert P. HAGEN, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 900095-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 23, 1990.

Defendant was convicted in the Eighth
District Court, Duchesne County, Dennis L.
Draney, J., of selling marijuana. Defendant appealed on ground that State failed
to establish court's jurisdiction over him.
Even if there was a question as to wheth- The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that:
er leave had been granted on June 29th, (1) supremacy clause and collateral estopZions, by filing an answer that did not pel principles required court to determine,
assert that defense, consented to the filing pursuant to federal cases, that crime site
and thereby waived that defense under was located within Indian reservation, and
Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce- (2) State's failure to meet its burden of
dure. See Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. showing that defendant was non-Indian reWilken, 668 P.2d 493 (Utah 1983) (defenses quired reversal and discharge of defendant,
which have not been raised by the answer even if State's failure to introduce evidence
or by proper motion may not be raised in stemmed from good-faith mistake on part
opposition to a motion for summary judg- of prosecution as to who had burden on
ment). Since the answer was filed within issue.
the statutory period, as determined by the
Conviction reversed; discharge ortrial court, the third party complaint was
timely filed against Zions. Inasmuch as a dered.
foreclosure action was properly initiated
against one of the parties in interest, the
remaining parties could be included under 1. Criminal Law *»1132
Judgment <*=>829(3)
the relation back doctrine as recently anDeferral of review of criminal convicnounced by the Utah Supreme Court in
tion
on issue of whether crime occurred on
Projects Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State
Indian
reservation was not required by reaThrift & Loan Co., 798 P.2d 738 (Utah
son of case pending before Utah Supreme
1990).
Court, in which prosecution argued that
I would therefore uphold Mickelson's me- location was not in fact an Indian reservachanic's lien as being timely filed.
tion, where federal courts had construed
location in other cases to be within reservation and did not appear to hold open any
f O fktVNUMMR SYSTEM)
role for state courts on issue; given supremacy clause and doctrine of collateral
estoppel, state courts could not reach contrary decision that would have any practical effect. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 6, cl. 2.
1. The fact that there is no record of a second
bearing is consistent with and supports the con-

elusion that there was, in fact, no second hearing.
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2. Indians *»1
Before it can be found that defendant
is Indian under federal law it must appear
that he has significant percentage of Indian blood and he must be recognized as
Indian either by federal government or by
some tribe or society of Indians.
3. Indians *=>1
Five-sixteenths Indian blood qualifies
as "significant percentage" of Indian blood
under federal test for determining whether
person is Indian.
4. Indians *=>1
Formal enrollment in tribe is not necessary to be recognized as Indian under federal law.
5. Indians *»38(5)
State did not meet its burden, in prosecution for sale of drugs that occurred on
Indian reservation, of showing that defendant was not Indian where only testimony
presented on issue was defendant's testimony, which was sufficient to meet federal
test for determining Indian status; even
assuming that trial court chose to discredit
defendant's testimony completely, result in
such case would have been that there was
no evidence in record on defendant's Indian
status, which was insufficient to satisfy
State's burden of proving non-Indian status
by preponderance of evidence.

as to who had burden on issue of Indian
status; when reversal results from failure
of State to prove jurisdiction, further trial
proceedings are not in order.
Harry H. Souvall (argued), McRae & DeLand, Vernal, for defendant and appellant
R. Paul Van Dam, State Atty. Gen.,
David B. Thompson (argued), Asst. Atty.
Gen., Governmental Affairs, Salt Lake
City, for plaintiff and appellee.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Before GARFF, JACKSON and ORME,
JJ., sitting in Vernal, Utah K

6. Criminal Law *»1166(1), 1187
State's failure to meet its burden of
showing that defendant was non-Indian in
prosecution for drug offense that occurred
on Indian reservation required reversal of
conviction and discharge of defendant, even
if State's failure of proof stemmed from
good-faith mistake on part of prosecution

ORME, Judge:
Defendant appeals his conviction on the
narrow ground that the crime for which he
was convicted, selling marijuana, was committed at Myton, Utah, a location within
the territorial confines of the Uintah and
Ouray Indian Reservation, and that the
state failed to establish the court's jurisdiction over him when it failed to prove he is
not an Indian when confronted with his
claim that he is. See, e.g., State v. St
Francis, 151 Vt 384, 563 A.2d 249, 251
(1989) ("If defendants are 'Indians' and the
crimes were committed within 'Indian country/ then Vermont has no jurisdiction over
defendants."); People v. Luna, 683 P.2d
862, 365 (Colo.Ct.App.1984) (state lacks jurisdiction to prosecute Indian defendants for
alleged sale and distribution of controlled
substances in "Indian country").
The state concedes on appeal that the
trial court erred in requiring defendant to
prove, by clear and convincing evidence,

1. Oral argument in this case was heard in Vernal, Utah. This court has frequently sat in locations other than the court's facility in Salt Lake
City, as permitted by Utah Code Ann. § 7*-2a-5
(1987). To date, panels of the court have heard
argument in both Vernal and Richfield on two
separate occasions, as well as in Logan, Brigham City, Cedar City, St. George, Fillmore, and
Manti. The cases heard "on circuit" typically
arose in the general area, and often one or both
attorneys reside in the area. Clients who might
otherwise have to pay for an attorney's time in
traveling to Salt Lake City can be spared that
expense. Parties who might not be able to

come to Salt Lake to hear their cases argued can
often do so in their own or a nearby community. School classes have occasionally attended
our proceedings. Local sheriffs and court personnel have invariably been cooperative and,
with the exception of an occasional glitch with
unfamiliar recording equipment and one instance of a motel operator mistaking us for
dog-show judges, our sessions outside Salt Lake
have come off without incident.
The court remains firm in its commitment to
hold sessions throughout the state, as local caseloads warrant and our own calendaring demands permit.
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that he is in fact an Indian. The state
properly concedes that the prosecution was
required to prove jurisdiction, i.e., that defendant was not an Indian, albeit only by a
preponderance of evidence. See, e.g., State
v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466, 469-70 (Utah
CtApp.1988).
The state advances two arguments
against reversal notwithstanding these concessions. First, it suggests that the precise question of whether Myton is really
within the confines of the reservation is
presently before the Utah Supreme Court
in the case of State v. Perank, No. 860196,
and that we should defer our consideration
of this case until the decision in that case is
issued. Second, it argues that we should
remand, either to let the trial court reassess the evidence before it with the matters
of burden of proof and evidentiary standard correctly in mind or, preferably, to
give the state the chance to put on additional jurisdictional evidence since its failure to
put on sufficient evidence resulted from an
honest mistake on its part, shared by the
trial court, concerning who had the burden
of proof on defendant's claimed Indian status.
[1] Both arguments may be summarily
dealt with. The federal courts, construing
federal statutes, federal regulations, and
federal Indian policy, have determined that
Myton is within the confines of the reservation. See Ute Indian Tribe v. State of
Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir.1985) (en
banc), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 994, 107 S.Ct.
596, 93 L.Ed.2d 596 (1986). See also Ute
Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F.Supp.
1072, 1188 (D.Utah 1981) (map appended to
court's opinion depicts Myton as being well
within both present and historical boundaries of Uintah and Ouray Reservation).
2. Two elements must be satisfied before it can
be found that [a defendant] is an Indian under
federal law. Initially, it must appear that he
has a significant percentage of Indian blood.
Secondly, the [defendant] must be recognized as
an Indian either by the federal government or
by some tribe or society of Indians." Goforth v.
State, 644 P.2d 114, 116 (Okla.Crim.1982). Fivesixteenths Indian blood clearly qualifies as a
"significant percentage," the historical debate
treated in the cases focusing on whether two
•sixteenths is enough. See, e.g., Sully v. United

The Tenth Circuit's decision does not appear to hold open any role for the state
courts in refining its holding in Ute Indian
Tribe. While we have not been acquainted
with the precise arguments advanced by
the state in Perank, we are hard-pressed to
see how, given the Supremacy Clause and
the doctrine of collateral estoppel, our state
courts could reach a contrary decision that
would have any practical effect. Seeing no
possibility of an effective decision in Perank contrary to the result in Ute Indian
Tribe, we see no reason to await the Perank decision, especially since defendant is
presently incarcerated.
12-5] Nor would remand be appropriate. The only testimony concerning whether defendant is an Indian is that which was
offered by defendant himself. Defendant
testified that he has lived on Indian reservations all his life, that he has attended
reservation schools and been treated at reservation hospitals, that he is a member of
the Little Shell Tribe of Chippewa Indians,
that he had received proceeds from a judgment entered in favor of various bands of
the Chippewas pursuant to a distribution
made by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and
that his ancestry is 5/16ths Indian. Crossexamination established that defendant
was not a Ute, that he was not actually
"enrolled" in any tribe, and that his father
was not an Indian. Under the applicable
test,2 there is simply no way this evidence
could be "weighed" by the trial court to
come to the conclusion that the state had
met its burden of proving jurisdiction by
proving that defendant is not an Indian.
Indeed, even if the court chose to discredit
defendant's testimony completely, the result would be that there is no evidence in
the record at all concerning defendant's
States, 195 F. 113 (8th Cir.1912) (one-eighth
Indian blood is sufficient); Vialpando v. State,
640 P.2d 77, 80 (Wyo.1982) (one-eighth Indian
blood not sufficient). The "recognition" requirement is more fluid. See, e.g., St. Cloud v.
United States, 702 F.Supp. 1456, 1461 (D.S.D.
1988) (factors to consider include government
provision of "assistance reserved only to Indians," receiving "benefits of tribal affiliation,"
living on a reservation). Formal enrollment in
a federally recognized tribe is not required. Id.
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Indian or non-Indian status. The state simply could not meet its burden in the absence of any evidence establishing jurisdiction.
[6] Nor is the state entitled to a second
chance to put on evidence addressed to the
jurisdictional issue. When reversal results
from the failure of the state to prove jurisdiction, further trial proceedings are not in
order. On the contrary, the conviction is
reversed and the defendant is ordered discharged. See, e.g., Sorenson, 758 P.2d at
470. We have not been shown that any
exception exists where the failure of proof
stems from a good-faith mistake on the
part of the prosecution.1
Defendant's conviction is reversed and
he is ordered discharged.
GARFF and JACKSON, JJ., concur.

(p

iKIVNUMftill SYSTEM>

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Ricky PALMER, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 890583-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 27, 1990.
Appeal from Third District, Salt Lake;
Leonard H. Russon, Judge.
James C. Bradshaw, Joan C. Watt, Salt
Lake Legal Defender Asso., Salt Lake City,
for defendant and appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam, Atty. Gen., David B.
Thompson, Judy Atherton, Asst. Attys.
Gen., for plaintiff and appellee.
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and
ORME, JJ.
3. We assume the vast majority of instances
where the prosecution fails to meet its burden
to prove jurisdiction results from some honest

ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon
appellant's motion to stay issuance of the
remittitur filed 20 November 1990.
Appellant seeks to stay the remittitur
pending disposition of appellant's petition
for rehearing. Rule 36(a), Utah R.App.P.,
provides that a remittitur shall not issue
until five days after entry of an order
disposing of a timely rehearing petition.
By Order filed 23 November 1990, the
Court granted appellant an extension of
time to 19 December 1990 to file the petition for rehearing. The Order automatically stayed issuance of the remittitur by virtue of Rule 36(a). Appellant's request to
stay the remittitur pending disposition of
the rehearing petition is therefore unnecessary.
Appellant also seeks to stay the remittitur pending resolution of a petition for
writ of certiorari, in the event that appellant files said petition in the Utah Supreme
Court. Rule 36(b), Utah R.App.P., provides
that a stay of the remittitur may be granted pending application for review. Appellant seeks a stay of the remittitur "in the
event Petitioner's Petition for Rehearing is
denied, until Appellant's Petition for Writ
of Certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court is
resolved." Appellant's motion to stay the
remittitur pending disposition of a potential
petition for certiorari is premature, but
may be renewed after entry of the order
disposing of the petition for rehearing.
Upon receipt of such a motion within the
five-day period contemplated in Rule 36(a),
the clerk of the court, consistent with her
usual practice, will defer remittitur until
such time as the motion is acted upon by
the court.
Now therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is denied.
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mistake on its part concerning its burden and
how to meet it.

